After New Carthage Scipio spent the winter training his army into exactly the type of force he wanted. 5 Kilometer runs in full armor were regular occurrences. It is during this training period where Scipio is thought to have reorganized his army to implement small unit tactics and the adoption or adaption of the falcata sword.
Three Carthaginian armies were in Iberia but were separated to maintain order in the often rebellious regions of Iberia. Scipio targeted Hannibal’s brother, Hasdrubal Barca, who had a smaller army. Hasdrubal camped atop a hill near the town of Baecula and fortified, waiting for one of the other two armies to reinforce him. Scipio, in his first field battle, decided to take the initiative while he had the numbers and sent his men to attack up the steep hills. Attacking up a hill, especially one as steep as at Baecula, was almost always a terrible decision, but Scipio’s small unit training allowed small groups of Romans to gain chunks of ground at a time and his skirmishers closed into hand to hand combat to hold the Carthaginian troops on the hill long enough for Scipio to lead a flanking maneuver up, around and down the hill against the defenders and routing them.
This series of small maneuvers that culminated in a sweeping flanking movement was all the more impressive as it was achieved up a hill that had been fortified by rock and earth walls by the defenders. These tactics are quite separate from those used by the majority of Roman commanders at the time, which involved a simple mass push by the heavy infantry.
After Baecula, Scipio had to deal with the remaining armies in Iberia, Hasdrubal ultimately left Iberia to reinforce Hannibal through the Alps. After gaining more troops over the next year the two Carthaginian armies under Hasdrubal Gisgo and Mago Barca sought to expel Scipio from Iberia. The combined army outnumbered Scipio’s by at least 10,000 men. As neither wanted to attack the others more defensible position the two forces marched their armies out into battle array for an hour or two and just returned to camp every day for almost a week.
This was common as most generals were fine with waiting to force the other to bring the fight to them. Scipio did just that but he set up his army for success before they even left the camp. Waking early, Scipio marched his army out with his heavy Roman infantry on the flanks and his lighter mercenaries and allies in the center, the opposite formation he had been showing Hasdrubal Gisgo the past few days.
Scipio harassed Hasdrubal’s camp and forced him to march his army out without proper preparations. Hasdrubal saw Scipio’s changed formation and how the Roman flanks would overpower his weaker flanks but had no time to rearrange his whole army as Scipio was on the attack. The Romans did indeed crash into the flanks, but Scipio held back his weaker center. This kept Hasdrubal’s heavy infantry center, originally positioned to counter the Roman infantry, out of the fight. If committed to helping the flanks the Carthaginian center risked being flanked by the unengaged Iberians. If they were too charge the Iberians they would have left their flanks open to the rear lines of the Romans, the most veteran Triarii. As the Romans routed the flanks and fell on the center the Iberians finally engaged and completed the rout.
The battle of Ilipa was a masterful victory by Scipio, fought against a larger and more experienced army. It was a sound victory all around and Scipio actually seized the initiative immediately after Ilipa by chasing the enemy. After resting his army just overnight he sent his cavalry out the next morning to slow the enemy enough for his infantry to catch them. The remnants of Hasdrubal and Mago’s army were almost all either killed or captured while the two commanders were able to slip away in the night. The Iberian Peninsula now belonged to Rome, taking away a huge source of income, manpower and a land route to Italy away from Carthage. Next time we will look at Scipio’s Invasion of Africa and his ultimate test against Hannibal.
By William McLaughlin for War History Online